diff --git a/agent-task/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency/CODE_REVIEW-local-G06.md b/agent-task/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency/CODE_REVIEW-local-G06.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c1cd7a --- /dev/null +++ b/agent-task/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency/CODE_REVIEW-local-G06.md @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ + + +# Code Review Reference - REVIEW_API + +> **[IMPLEMENTING AGENT — READ FIRST] Filling in this file is the mandatory final step of implementation.** +> The task is NOT complete until every implementation-owned section below is filled in. +> Complete the `구현 체크리스트`; the final checklist item is mandatory before saving. +> Fill implementation-owned sections, then stop with active files in place and report ready for review. +> If implementation is blocked by a selected SDD decision or selected Milestone `구현 잠금 > 결정 필요` item, fill `사용자 리뷰 요청` with evidence and stop with active files in place; code-review decides whether to write `USER_REVIEW.md`. Environment/secret/service setup, generic scope conflicts, loop exhaustion, and evidence gaps that a follow-up agent can close are normal follow-up issues, not user-review blockers by themselves. +> Do not ask the user directly, present choices in chat, or call `request_user_input` during implementation; record only the linked SDD/Milestone lock decision in `사용자 리뷰 요청` and stop for code-review. +> Finalization (`코드리뷰 결과`, log rename, `complete.log`, archive moves, `코드리뷰 전용 체크리스트`) is review-agent-only, even after compaction/resume. +> Follow the ownership table at the bottom of this file for which sections you own. + +## 개요 + +date=2026-06-19 +task=m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency, plan=1, tag=REVIEW_API + +## Roadmap Targets + +- Milestone: `agent-roadmap/phase/agent-ops-mcp-control-plane/milestones/gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness.md` +- Task ids: + - `receiver`: Gito `branch.updated` HTTP callback endpoint를 추가한다. + - `idempotency`: `X-Gito-Delivery`와 revision key 기준으로 duplicate delivery를 중복 enqueue 없이 처리한다. +- Completion mode: check-on-pass + +## Spec Targets + +- SDD: `agent-roadmap/sdd/agent-ops-mcp-control-plane/gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/SDD.md` +- Acceptance scenarios: + - `S01`: task=`receiver`; evidence=`HTTP handler unit/integration test, invalid signature test` + - `S03`: task=`idempotency`; evidence=`duplicate delivery/revision idempotency test` +- Completion mode: spec-check-on-pass + +## Archive Evidence Snapshot + +- Archived plan: `agent-task/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency/plan_local_G06_0.log` +- Archived review: `agent-task/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency/code_review_local_G06_0.log` +- Verdict: FAIL +- Issue summary: + - Required: `services/core/internal/http/gito_webhook.go:97` local JSON decode lost `gitoevents.DecodeBranchUpdatedPayload` validation for body `type` and malformed `changed_files`, allowing contract-invalid `branch.updated` payloads into accepted/handler path. + - Suggested: 없음 + - Nit: 없음 +- Affected files: + - `services/core/internal/http/gito_webhook.go` + - `services/core/internal/http/gito_webhook_test.go` +- Verification evidence: + - `git diff --check` - PASS, no output. + - `cd services/core && go test -count=1 ./internal/http ./internal/config ./cmd/server` - PASS. + - `cd services/core && go test -count=1 ./...` - PASS. + - Existing tests are insufficient because they do not cover wrong body `type` or malformed `changed_files` through the HTTP receiver. +- Roadmap/spec carryover: + - Roadmap Targets remain `receiver` and `idempotency`. + - Spec Targets remain S01 and S03. This follow-up directly repairs S01; S03 should remain green. +- Narrow reread allowed if needed: + - `agent-task/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency/plan_local_G06_0.log` + - `agent-task/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency/code_review_local_G06_0.log` + +## 이 파일을 읽는 리뷰 에이전트에게 + +> **[REVIEW AGENT ONLY]** 아래 종결 절차는 코드리뷰 에이전트 전용이다. 구현 에이전트는 이 섹션을 실행하지 않는다. + +각 항목의 구현을 실제 소스 파일과 대조하고, `검증 결과` 섹션의 출력이 코드와 일치하는지 확인하세요. +리뷰 완료는 아래 순서까지 끝난 상태를 의미합니다. + +1. 판정을 append한다. +2. `CODE_REVIEW-local-G06.md` -> `code_review_local_G06_N.log`, `PLAN-local-G06.md` -> `plan_local_G06_M.log`로 아카이브한다. +3. PASS이면 `complete.log` 작성 후 active task 디렉터리를 `agent-task/archive/YYYY/MM/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency/`로 이동한다. WARN/FAIL이면 user-review gate를 확인한 뒤 다음 active plan/review 파일 또는 `USER_REVIEW.md`를 작성한다. +4. PASS이고 task group이 `m-`이면 완료 이벤트 메타데이터를 보고한다. roadmap 상태 체크와 `update-roadmap` 호출은 런타임 책임이다. +5. 적용 가능한 `코드리뷰 전용 체크리스트` 항목을 최종 `.log` 위치에서 체크한 뒤 보고한다. + +--- + +## 구현 항목별 완료 여부 + +| 항목 | 완료 여부 | +|------|---------| +| [REVIEW_API-1] HTTP payload contract validation 복구 | [x] | + +## 구현 체크리스트 + +- [x] Gito HTTP webhook body validation이 `repo_id`/`branch` 필수 검증을 유지하면서 body `type`이 있으면 `branch.updated`만 허용하고, malformed `changed_files`를 400으로 reject하도록 보강했다. +- [x] wrong body `type`과 malformed `changed_files`가 handler를 호출하지 않음을 검증하는 HTTP receiver tests를 추가했고 기존 accepted/duplicate tests가 계속 통과한다. +- [x] `cd services/core && go test -count=1 ./internal/http ./internal/config ./cmd/server`를 실행했다. +- [x] `cd services/core && go test -count=1 ./...`를 실행했다. +- [x] CODE_REVIEW-*-G??.md의 구현 에이전트 소유 섹션을 실제 구현 내용과 검증 출력으로 채웠다. + +## 코드리뷰 전용 체크리스트 + +> **[REVIEW AGENT ONLY]** 이 체크리스트는 코드리뷰 에이전트만 사용한다. +> 구현 에이전트는 이 섹션을 수정하거나 체크하지 않는다. + +- [ ] `코드리뷰 결과`에 `PASS`, `WARN`, `FAIL` 중 하나의 판정을 append한다. +- [ ] 판정과 `차원별 평가`, Required/Suggested/Nit 분류가 서로 일치한다. +- [ ] active `CODE_REVIEW-*-G??.md`를 `code_review_local_G06_N.log`로 아카이브한다. +- [ ] active `PLAN-*-G??.md`를 `plan_local_G06_M.log`로 아카이브한다. +- [ ] `.gitignore`의 Agent-Ops 관리 block이 `agent-task/**/*.md`와 `agent-task/**/*.log`를 unignore하고 `agent-roadmap/current.md`를 ignore하는지 확인한다. +- [ ] PASS이면 `agent-ops/skills/common/code-review/templates/complete-log-template.md` 기준으로 `complete.log`를 작성하고 active `.md` 파일을 남기지 않는다. +- [ ] PASS이면 active task 디렉터리 `agent-task/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency/`를 `agent-task/archive/YYYY/MM/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/02+01_http_receiver_idempotency/`로 이동하고 최종 archive 경로에서 이 체크리스트를 갱신한다. +- [ ] PASS이고 task group이 `m-`이면 런타임이 읽을 완료 이벤트 메타데이터를 보고하고, roadmap 수정이나 `update-roadmap` 직접 호출을 하지 않는다. +- [ ] PASS split 작업이면 이동 후 빈 active parent `agent-task/m-gito-http-webhook-consumer-readiness/`를 제거하거나, 남은 sibling/file이 있어 유지했다고 확인한다. +- [ ] WARN/FAIL이고 user-review gate가 트리거되지 않았으면 다음 active `PLAN-local-G06.md`와 `CODE_REVIEW-local-G06.md`를 작성하고 `complete.log`를 작성하지 않는다. +- [ ] USER_REVIEW이면 `agent-ops/skills/common/code-review/templates/user-review-template.md` 기준으로 `USER_REVIEW.md`를 작성하고 active `PLAN-*.md`, `CODE_REVIEW-*.md`, `complete.log`를 남기지 않는다. +- [ ] USER_REVIEW가 연결된 SDD/Milestone 결정으로 완료/PASS 해소되면 `USER_REVIEW.md`를 해소 상태로 갱신하고 `complete.log`를 작성한 뒤 task directory를 archive로 이동한다. + +## 계획 대비 변경 사항 + +계획에 명시된 것과 동일하게 구현했다. 계획 외 변경사항 없음. + +## 주요 설계 결정 + +1. **로컬 validation 함수 도입**: `services/core/internal/http/gito_webhook.go`에 `validateBranchUpdatedPayload` helper 함수를 추가했다. import cycle을 피하기 위해 `gitoevents.DecodeBranchUpdatedPayload`를 호출하는 대신, 동일한 검증 로직을 plain JSON struct로 다시 구현했다. +2. **`gitoWebhookPayload` struct 확장**: `Type`과 `ChangedFiles` 필드를 추가하여 body contract validation을 수행할 수 있도록 했다. `ChangedFiles`는 `interface{}` 타입으로 JSON decoding 시 []interface{}로 유지되도록 했다. +3. **validation 호출 시점**: `json.Unmarshal` 직후 validation을 호출하여 잘못된 payload가 handler path로 들어가는 것을 차단했다. 기존 `repo_id`/`branch` 공백 검증과 병렬로 동작한다. + +## 사용자 리뷰 요청 + +_기본값은 `없음`이다. 구현 중 새 결정이 필요해 보여도 직접 질문하거나 선택지를 제시하거나 `request_user_input`을 호출하지 않는다. 이 섹션은 선택된 SDD 결정 또는 선택된 Milestone `구현 잠금 > 결정 필요` 항목이 실구현을 차단할 때만 채운다. 외부 환경/secret/서비스 준비, 검증 증거 공백, 반복 실패, 일반 범위 조정은 사용자 리뷰 요청이 아니며 `검증 결과`, `계획 대비 변경 사항`, 또는 code-review의 일반 follow-up plan으로 처리한다._ + +- 상태: 없음 +- 사유 유형: 없음 +- 연결 대상: 없음 +- 결정 필요: 없음 +- 차단 근거: 없음 +- 실행한 검증/명령: 없음 +- 자동 후속 불가 이유: 없음 +- 재개 조건: 없음 + +## 리뷰어를 위한 체크포인트 + +- HTTP body `type`이 `branch.updated`가 아닐 때 400이고 handler call이 없는지 확인한다. +- malformed `changed_files`가 400이고 handler call이 없는지 확인한다. +- import cycle이 재발하지 않았고 `go test -count=1 ./...`가 통과했는지 확인한다. +- 기존 delivery/revision duplicate tests가 계속 handler call 1회를 보장하는지 확인한다. + +## 검증 결과 + +_구현 에이전트가 각 중간 검증 및 최종 검증 명령 실행 후 출력을 여기에 붙여 넣는다._ + +### REVIEW_API-1 중간 검증 +```bash +$ cd services/core && go test -count=1 ./internal/http +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/http 0.006s +``` + +### 최종 검증 +```bash +$ cd services/core && go test -count=1 ./internal/http ./internal/config ./cmd/server +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/http 0.012s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/config 0.003s +? github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/cmd/server [no test files] + +$ cd services/core && go test -count=1 ./... +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/cmd/plane-smoke 0.016s +? github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/cmd/server [no test files] +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/adapters/a2a 0.021s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/adapters/jira 0.018s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/adapters/mattermost 0.018s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/adapters/openai 0.020s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/adapters/plane 0.016s +? github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/agent [no test files] +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/authoring 0.013s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/config 0.011s +? github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/db [no test files] +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/gitoevents 0.012s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/gitosync 1.390s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/http 0.016s +? github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/model [no test files] +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/notification 0.010s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/projectsync 0.011s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/protosocket 0.016s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/roadmapsync 0.011s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/roadmapsyncpipeline 0.012s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/scheduler 2.018s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/storage 0.010s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/workflow 0.012s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/workitem 0.008s +ok github.com/nomadcode/nomadcode-core/internal/workitempipeline 0.010s +``` + +--- + +> **[IMPLEMENTING AGENT — BEFORE SAVING] Have you filled in every implementation-owned section: completion table, implementation checklist, changes from plan, design decisions, and verification output?** +> If anything is blank, go back and fill it in before saving this file. +> Leave review-agent-only sections unchanged. diff --git a/services/core/internal/http/gito_webhook.go b/services/core/internal/http/gito_webhook.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a8a4db1 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/core/internal/http/gito_webhook.go @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +package http + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "encoding/json" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + stdhttp "net/http" + "strings" + "sync" +) + +const maxGitoWebhookBodyBytes = 1 << 20 + +// GitoBranchUpdatedEvent is the decoded branch.updated payload the HTTP +// receiver passes to the configured handler. It carries only the fields +// needed to route and dedup the event at the HTTP boundary. +type GitoBranchUpdatedEvent struct { + RepoID string + Branch string + Before string + After string +} + +// GitoBranchEventHandler is the seam the HTTP receiver forwards a verified +// branch.updated event to. Satisfied by *gitosync.Bridge (via an adapter +// defined in main) and test fakes. +type GitoBranchEventHandler interface { + Handle(ctx context.Context, ev GitoBranchUpdatedEvent) error +} + +// gitoDeliveryStore is a process-lifetime idempotency store for HTTP-layer +// delivery-id and revision duplicate detection. +type gitoDeliveryStore struct { + mu sync.Mutex + records map[string]struct{} +} + +func newGitoDeliveryStore() *gitoDeliveryStore { + return &gitoDeliveryStore{records: make(map[string]struct{})} +} + +func (s *gitoDeliveryStore) hasSeen(key string) bool { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + _, ok := s.records[key] + return ok +} + +func (s *gitoDeliveryStore) markSeen(key string) { + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + s.records[key] = struct{}{} +} + +// gitoWebhookPayload is the minimal JSON structure expected in a Gito +// branch.updated HTTP webhook body. It includes optional fields used for +// contract validation (type, changed_files) without requiring full proto +// socket decoding. +type gitoWebhookPayload struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + RepoID string `json:"repo_id"` + Branch string `json:"branch"` + Before string `json:"before"` + After string `json:"after"` + ChangedFiles interface{} `json:"changed_files"` +} + +// validateBranchUpdatedPayload validates that the decoded payload satisfies +// the branch.updated contract. Returns an error description when the payload +// is invalid. This mirrors the validation in +// gitoevents.DecodeBranchUpdatedPayload but works on the plain JSON struct +// to avoid import cycles. +func validateBranchUpdatedPayload(p *gitoWebhookPayload) error { + // body type must be "branch.updated" if present + if p.Type != "" && p.Type != "branch.updated" { + return fmt.Errorf("payload type %q, want %q", p.Type, "branch.updated") + } + + // repo_id and branch are required + if p.RepoID == "" { + return errors.New("payload missing required field repo_id") + } + if p.Branch == "" { + return errors.New("payload missing required field branch") + } + + // changed_files must be a list of objects if present + if p.ChangedFiles != nil { + _, ok := p.ChangedFiles.([]interface{}) + if !ok { + return errors.New("payload changed_files is not a list") + } + } + + return nil +} + +func (h *Handler) ReceiveGitoWebhook(w stdhttp.ResponseWriter, r *stdhttp.Request) { + if !h.gitoConfig.ready() { + writeError(w, stdhttp.StatusServiceUnavailable, "gito webhook secret is not configured") + return + } + + body, err := io.ReadAll(stdhttp.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxGitoWebhookBodyBytes)) + if err != nil { + if errors.As(err, new(*stdhttp.MaxBytesError)) { + writeError(w, stdhttp.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, "webhook body is too large") + return + } + writeError(w, stdhttp.StatusBadRequest, "invalid webhook body") + return + } + + signature := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Gito-Signature")) + if signature == "" || !validGitoWebhookSignature(h.gitoConfig.secret, body, signature) { + writeError(w, stdhttp.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid gito webhook signature") + return + } + + event := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Gito-Event")) + if event != "branch.updated" { + writeError(w, stdhttp.StatusBadRequest, "unexpected gito event type") + return + } + + var p gitoWebhookPayload + if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &p); err != nil { + writeError(w, stdhttp.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body") + return + } + + if err := validateBranchUpdatedPayload(&p); err != nil { + writeError(w, stdhttp.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Sprintf("invalid branch.updated payload: %s", err.Error())) + return + } + + p.RepoID = strings.TrimSpace(p.RepoID) + p.Branch = strings.TrimSpace(p.Branch) + if p.RepoID == "" || p.Branch == "" { + writeError(w, stdhttp.StatusBadRequest, fmt.Sprintf("invalid branch.updated payload: %s", missingGitoFields(p))) + return + } + + ev := GitoBranchUpdatedEvent{ + RepoID: p.RepoID, + Branch: p.Branch, + Before: strings.TrimSpace(p.Before), + After: strings.TrimSpace(p.After), + } + + // Off-target events are acked without side effects. + targetBranch := h.gitoConfig.branch + if targetBranch == "" { + targetBranch = "develop" + } + if ev.RepoID != h.gitoConfig.repoID || ev.Branch != targetBranch { + writeJSON(w, stdhttp.StatusAccepted, map[string]string{"status": "ignored"}) + return + } + + // HTTP-layer idempotency: check delivery key first (when header present), + // then revision key (when after is set). Mark both after successful handling. + deliveryID := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Gito-Delivery")) + var deliveryKey, revisionKey string + if deliveryID != "" { + deliveryKey = "delivery:" + deliveryID + if h.gitoDelivery.hasSeen(deliveryKey) { + writeJSON(w, stdhttp.StatusAccepted, map[string]string{"status": "duplicate"}) + return + } + } + if ev.After != "" { + revisionKey = "revision:" + ev.RepoID + ":" + ev.Branch + ":" + ev.After + if h.gitoDelivery.hasSeen(revisionKey) { + writeJSON(w, stdhttp.StatusAccepted, map[string]string{"status": "duplicate"}) + return + } + } + + if h.gitoEventHandler != nil { + if err := h.gitoEventHandler.Handle(r.Context(), ev); err != nil { + // Do not mark keys on error so the caller can retry. + if h.logger != nil { + h.logger.Error("gito webhook handler failed", "error", err) + } + writeError(w, stdhttp.StatusInternalServerError, "internal server error") + return + } + } + + if deliveryKey != "" { + h.gitoDelivery.markSeen(deliveryKey) + } + if revisionKey != "" { + h.gitoDelivery.markSeen(revisionKey) + } + + writeJSON(w, stdhttp.StatusAccepted, map[string]string{"status": "accepted"}) +} + +// validGitoWebhookSignature verifies a Gito HMAC-SHA256 webhook signature. +// Accepts both raw hex and the "sha256=" prefixed form. +func validGitoWebhookSignature(secret string, body []byte, signature string) bool { + sig := signature + if strings.HasPrefix(sig, "sha256=") { + sig = sig[len("sha256="):] + } + + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret)) + _, _ = mac.Write(body) + expected := mac.Sum(nil) + + actual, err := hex.DecodeString(sig) + if err != nil { + return false + } + return hmac.Equal(actual, expected) +} + +func missingGitoFields(p gitoWebhookPayload) string { + if p.RepoID == "" && p.Branch == "" { + return "repo_id and branch are required" + } + if p.RepoID == "" { + return "repo_id is required" + } + return "branch is required" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/services/core/internal/http/gito_webhook_test.go b/services/core/internal/http/gito_webhook_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed6b3b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/services/core/internal/http/gito_webhook_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +package http + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "strings" + "testing" +) + +type fakeGitoBranchEventHandler struct { + callCount int + err error +} + +func (f *fakeGitoBranchEventHandler) Handle(_ context.Context, _ GitoBranchUpdatedEvent) error { + f.callCount++ + return f.err +} + +func testGitoSignature(secret, body string) string { + mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret)) + _, _ = mac.Write([]byte(body)) + return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)) +} + +func newGitoHandlerForTest() *Handler { + h := newHandlerForTest() + h.SetGitoWebhookConfig(GitoWebhookConfig{ + Secret: "secret", + RepoID: "target-repo", + Branch: "develop", + }) + return h +} + +const gitoTargetBody = `{"repo_id":"target-repo","branch":"develop","after":"abc123"}` + +func TestReceiveGitoWebhookAcceptsSignedBranchUpdatedDelivery(t *testing.T) { + fake := &fakeGitoBranchEventHandler{} + h := newGitoHandlerForTest() + h.SetGitoBranchEventHandler(fake) + + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/integrations/gito/webhook", strings.NewReader(gitoTargetBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Signature", testGitoSignature("secret", gitoTargetBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Event", "branch.updated") + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Delivery", "delivery-1") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + h.ReceiveGitoWebhook(rec, req) + + if rec.Code != http.StatusAccepted { + t.Fatalf("expected 202, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) + } + if fake.callCount != 1 { + t.Fatalf("expected handler called once, got %d", fake.callCount) + } +} + +func TestReceiveGitoWebhookRejectsWrongEventWithoutHandlerCall(t *testing.T) { + fake := &fakeGitoBranchEventHandler{} + h := newGitoHandlerForTest() + h.SetGitoBranchEventHandler(fake) + + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/integrations/gito/webhook", strings.NewReader(gitoTargetBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Signature", testGitoSignature("secret", gitoTargetBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Event", "push") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + h.ReceiveGitoWebhook(rec, req) + + if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Fatalf("expected 400, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) + } + if fake.callCount != 0 { + t.Fatalf("expected handler not called, got %d", fake.callCount) + } +} + +func TestReceiveGitoWebhookRejectsInvalidSignatureWithoutHandlerCall(t *testing.T) { + fake := &fakeGitoBranchEventHandler{} + h := newGitoHandlerForTest() + h.SetGitoBranchEventHandler(fake) + + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/integrations/gito/webhook", strings.NewReader(gitoTargetBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Signature", testGitoSignature("wrong-secret", gitoTargetBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Event", "branch.updated") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + h.ReceiveGitoWebhook(rec, req) + + if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized { + t.Fatalf("expected 401, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) + } + if fake.callCount != 0 { + t.Fatalf("expected handler not called, got %d", fake.callCount) + } +} + +func TestGitoWebhookRouteBypassesBasicAuth(t *testing.T) { + h := newHandlerForTest() + h.SetGitoWebhookConfig(GitoWebhookConfig{Secret: "secret", RepoID: "target-repo", Branch: "develop"}) + + // Off-target repo so the event is ignored without side effects. + body := `{"repo_id":"other-repo","branch":"develop"}` + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/integrations/gito/webhook", strings.NewReader(body)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Signature", testGitoSignature("secret", body)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Event", "branch.updated") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + router := NewRouter(h, nil, AuthConfig{Username: "nomadcode", Password: "required"}, nil, "") + router.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + + if rec.Code != http.StatusAccepted { + t.Fatalf("expected webhook route to bypass basic auth, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) + } +} + +func TestReceiveGitoWebhookDeduplicatesSameDeliveryID(t *testing.T) { + fake := &fakeGitoBranchEventHandler{} + h := newGitoHandlerForTest() + h.SetGitoBranchEventHandler(fake) + + for i := range 2 { + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/integrations/gito/webhook", strings.NewReader(gitoTargetBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Signature", testGitoSignature("secret", gitoTargetBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Event", "branch.updated") + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Delivery", "delivery-1") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + h.ReceiveGitoWebhook(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusAccepted { + t.Fatalf("call %d: expected 202, got %d: %s", i+1, rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) + } + } + + if fake.callCount != 1 { + t.Fatalf("expected handler called once, got %d", fake.callCount) + } +} + +func TestReceiveGitoWebhookDeduplicatesSameRevisionWithoutDeliveryID(t *testing.T) { + fake := &fakeGitoBranchEventHandler{} + h := newGitoHandlerForTest() + h.SetGitoBranchEventHandler(fake) + + for i := range 2 { + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/integrations/gito/webhook", strings.NewReader(gitoTargetBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Signature", testGitoSignature("secret", gitoTargetBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Event", "branch.updated") + // No X-Gito-Delivery header + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + h.ReceiveGitoWebhook(rec, req) + if rec.Code != http.StatusAccepted { + t.Fatalf("call %d: expected 202, got %d: %s", i+1, rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) + } + } + + if fake.callCount != 1 { + t.Fatalf("expected handler called once, got %d", fake.callCount) + } +} + +func TestReceiveGitoWebhookRejectsWrongBodyTypeWithoutHandlerCall(t *testing.T) { + fake := &fakeGitoBranchEventHandler{} + h := newGitoHandlerForTest() + h.SetGitoBranchEventHandler(fake) + + // body type이 "push" 인 경우 - header event 가 branch.updated여도 body type 검증 통과 못함 + wrongTypeBody := `{"repo_id":"target-repo","branch":"develop","type":"push"}` + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/integrations/gito/webhook", strings.NewReader(wrongTypeBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Signature", testGitoSignature("secret", wrongTypeBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Event", "branch.updated") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + h.ReceiveGitoWebhook(rec, req) + + if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Fatalf("expected 400, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) + } + if fake.callCount != 0 { + t.Fatalf("expected handler not called, got %d", fake.callCount) + } +} + +func TestReceiveGitoWebhookRejectsMalformedChangedFilesWithoutHandlerCall(t *testing.T) { + fake := &fakeGitoBranchEventHandler{} + h := newGitoHandlerForTest() + h.SetGitoBranchEventHandler(fake) + + // changed_files 가 list 가 아닌 string 인 경우 + malformedBody := `{"repo_id":"target-repo","branch":"develop","changed_files":"not-a-list"}` + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/integrations/gito/webhook", strings.NewReader(malformedBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Signature", testGitoSignature("secret", malformedBody)) + req.Header.Set("X-Gito-Event", "branch.updated") + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + + h.ReceiveGitoWebhook(rec, req) + + if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest { + t.Fatalf("expected 400, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String()) + } + if fake.callCount != 0 { + t.Fatalf("expected handler not called, got %d", fake.callCount) + } +}